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Abstract 
Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies’ energy subsidies cost the budget on average 4% of GDP 
in 2014. Resource rents permit administratively undemanding transfers to citizens to maintain 
political support, whose removal will be resisted, despite resulting inefficient consumption and 
lock-in risk. Collapsing energy prices delivering severe fiscal shocks combined with growing 
concerns over climate change damage make carefully designed reforms both urgent and 
politically more acceptable. Political logic suggests designing reforms that compensate vocal 
interest groups. The paper presents evidence on the magnitude and impacts of oil, gas and 
electricity subsidies, and discusses how the electricity sector can be weaned off subsidies, 
enabling CCGTs and unsubsidized renewables to reduce carbon emissions. 
 
JEL classification: H23, H53, Q41, Q48, Q54 
1. Introduction 
Typically, Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies (HESEs), defined in the next section, 
choose energy subsidies on the back of energy rents and energy exports as a way of 
passing those rents back to their citizens, and to buy public support with generous welfare 
benefits and subsidized energy. In the face of limited capacity to invest returns profitably 
locally, and perhaps lacking the confidence of the population that sovereign wealth funds 
will provide future benefits (or because the discount rate that the population applies 
exceeds the likely return to such funds) there are evident attractions in transferring at 
least some of the resource rents directly to the population.2  
Once subsidies are in place, the groups that benefit are likely to strongly resist 
their removal. Social welfare theory argues that resource rents in excess of the costs of 
basic administration should ideally be returned as lump sum demo-grants, translated into 
the public finance precept that they should be used to finance essential public services 
such as health and compulsory education that are their practical equivalent. Given the 
volatility of resource rents, it is also desirable to smooth revenue fluctuations by investing 
in or withdrawing from a sovereign wealth fund, such as the Norwegian Government 
                                                 
1 Paper written for The Energy Journal Special Issue on Renewables and Diversification in 
Heavily Energy Subsidized Economies. I am indebted to Jim Krane and three journal reviewers 
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
2 Victor (2009) sets out the political economy theory of interest groups that influence a 
government’s chances of survival. 
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Pension Fund (previously called the Petroleum Fund of Norway). The kinds of reforms to 
tax and expenditure systems favoured by public economics presuppose an efficient, 
trusted and uncorrupt fiscal system and public administration that may be lacking. Once 
alternative forms of rent allocation are chosen they can be hard to change.  
Just as energy taxes are easy to collect, so energy subsidies are easy to administer, 
even if they cumulatively lead to highly inefficient patterns of consumption with the risk 
of lock-in. As rents decline and/or as energy prices fluctuate, so the HESEs suffer 
increasingly severe fiscal shocks. As international pressure to alleviate climate change 
increases, HESEs find themselves increasingly isolated and face the risk of either global 
agreements on carbon pricing, or heavy import taxes on their energy exports, which may 
be extended through border tax adjustments to their energy-intensive exports.  
Subsidy reform is considered difficult (GSI, 2010; Whitley and van der Burg, 
2015) but understanding their political logic suggests designing reforms that compensate 
the most vociferous interest groups, while it may be easier to make structural reforms 
when the resource rents have fallen and budgets are under stress (OECD, 2010). Recent 
experience in some Gulf countries has belied the earlier pessimism that removing fuel 
subsidies was almost impossible. Saudi Arabia doubled gasoline prices and trebled diesel 
prices between 2015-16, with Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar all making major price 
increases (Krane and Hung, 2016). That suggests that concepts of solidarity may allow 
the removal of other subsidies that most benefit higher income groups – and the 
electricity sector is therefore a good sector for further reform. 
This paper examines strategies to reduce subsidies to electricity and decarbonize 
that sector. HESEs that have both oil and gas, and still use oil in power generation, would 
seem to have a simple option of switching to gas, which was the main source of 
electricity decarbonisation in Britain in the 1990s. HESEs that have already switched to 
gas face a harder task, as further decarbonisation would involve supporting renewable 
electricity supply, and in some cases, CCS or even nuclear power, if costs can be 
adequately reduced. Fortunately many HESEs have high levels of insolation that makes 
solar PV increasingly attractive and recent PV price falls have reinforced that prospect. 
That makes bringing fossil-fuel generation prices up to cost-reflective levels even more 
important so that an economic choice between fossil fuels and renewables can be made.  
The next section of the paper defines the concept of a heavily energy subsidizing 
economy and characterizes the extent and form that these subsidies take. Section 3 is the 
core of the paper, looking in detail at electricity subsidies, which requires an estimate of 
the opportunity cost of gas to determine the cost of gas-fired electricity generation. This 
involves a discussion of carbon pricing, and allows a comparison of the social costs of 
local gas and solar PV. The final subsection addresses electricity subsidy reform, building 
on evidence of successful reforms. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. HESEs – definitions and characteristics 
IEA (2016) presents the latest data on energy subsidies, discussed in IEA (2015). That 
shows world-wide fossil-fuel consumption subsidies of $493 billion in 2014, “$39 billion 
down on the previous year, in part due to the drop in international energy prices, with 
subsidies to oil products representing over half of the total. Those subsidies were over 
four-times the value of subsidies to renewable energy.” Heavily Energy Subsidized 
Economies (HESEs) are defined in this paper as those countries that devoted more than 
1.5% of GDP in 2014 to explicit subsidies to energy, as defined by the IEA (2016). The 
emphasis on explicit subsidies directs attention to their impact on the budgets of these 
countries, and massively understates the economic subsidies set out in Coady et al. (2015) 
and in Table 1. The fact that this paper concentrates on a subset of HESEs does not alter 
the fact that many other countries, including many advanced OECD countries, continue 
to subsidize fossil fuels while agreeing to the COP21 climate commitments. 
 
Table 1 Estimates of economic subsidies to fossil fuels, 2014, $US billions 
fuel 
pre-tax 
subsidies 
global 
warming 
air 
pollution 
foregone 
consumption 
tax revenue Total shares 
Oil $267 $202 $291 $224 $984 23% 
Coal $5 $617 $1,889 $19 $2,530 60% 
Nat gas $112 $267 $56 $48 $483 11% 
Electricity $156 
  
$76 $232 5% 
Total $541 $1,086 $2,235 $367 $4,229 100% 
shares 13% 26% 53% 9% 100%   
Source: Coady et al (2015) 
Note: excludes subsidies attributed to not charging for congestion, accidents and road damage as 
these are properly road vehicle externalities and would arise even with electric vehicles. 
The difference between the two measures of subsidies lie in the failure to charge 
for environmental externalities (air pollution and climate change damage), granting 
preferential treatment (state aids) to energy producers (lower borrowing rates to state 
enterprises) and the failure to levy efficient taxes on final producers (e.g. taxing energy at 
a lower rate of Value Added Tax than almost all other commodities). This difference is 
massive, as table 1 shows. Pre-tax subsidies, the explicit subsidies that effectively come 
out of the budget or deprive the budget of revenue, amounted to $541 bn in 2014, only 
13% of the total of $4,229 bn. Note the very high social cost of air pollution from coal, 
and that air pollution costs twice the estimated global warming damage (at the assumed 
2013 carbon price of $36/tonne CO2 from US Government, 2013). 
Table 2 gives the subsidies for the 30 HESE meeting the criterion of at least 1.5% 
of GDP in pre-tax subsidies in 2014, as a share of GDP and in US$ amounts, ranking the 
countries by the share of subsidies in GDP in descending order. 
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Table 2 2014 Subsidies (% of GDP and $ bn), 2013 resource rents and gasoline prices 
Country Oil gas Elec. Total 
$US 
bill 
GDP US$ 
bn 
US$GDP/kg 
oil eq. 
Resource 
rents 2013 
gasoline price 
$/L 
Iran 9.9% 5.5% 3.9% 19.3% $78.0 $425 $5.74 29.4% $0.37 
Libya 16.1% 0.2% 1.9% 18.0% $7.4 $41 $8.27 47.0% n.a. 
Turkmenistan 7.3% 6.9% 2.3% 16.3% $7.8 $48 $2.52 32.1% $0.22 
Venezuela 10.2% 1.6% 3.4% 15.2% $31.4 $381 $6.92 26.0% $0.02 
Uzbekistan 0.8% 11.3% 2.2% 14.3% $9.0 $63 $2.90 20.2% $1.02 
Saudi Arabia 6.6% 1.1% 1.8% 9.5% $71.3 $746 $7.19 46.4% $0.16 
Algeria 6.5% 1.5% 1.4% 9.4% $20.2 $214 $10.67 28.2% $0.27 
Oman 3.7% 3.2% 1.9% 9.0% $7.0 $82 $5.55 38.8% $0.31 
Egypt 5.6% 0.6% 1.8% 8.0% $23.0 $287 $11.03 10.9% $0.88 
Bahrain 2.3% 0.0% 4.4% 6.7% $2.3 $34 $4.26 23.6% n.a. 
Bolivia 4.7% 0.6% 0.6% 5.6% $1.9 $33 $6.97 16.1% $0.70 
Ecuador 5.1% 0.0% 0.5% 5.6% $5.6 $101 $11.04 17.0% $0.60 
Iraq 4.7% 0.0% 0.9% 5.6% $12.4 $224 $10.64 42.9% $0.43 
Kuwait 2.0% 0.8% 2.3% 5.1% $8.8 $164 $7.61 59.1% $0.22 
Ukraine 0.0% 2.8% 2.1% 4.9% $6.4 $132 $3.09 9.7% $1.17 
UAE 1.2% 2.4% 0.9% 4.4% $17.6 $399 $7.97 23.7% $0.47 
Trin. & Tob. 2.2% 0.0% 1.4% 3.6% $1.0 $29 $2.09 34.4% n.a. 
Indonesia 2.2% 0.0% 0.9% 3.1% $27.7 $889 $10.78 7.6% $0.93 
Qatar 1.1% 0.8% 1.1% 3.0% $6.2 $210 $7.07 34.6% $0.23 
Pakistan 0.0% 1.8% 0.9% 2.7% $6.8 $244 $9.06 3.9% $0.94 
Argentina 0.4% 0.9% 1.2% 2.5% $13.6 $538   3.8% $1.52 
Brunei 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% $0.4 $17 $7.65 35.1% $0.41 
Kazakhstan 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 2.5% $5.3 $218 $4.82 31.5% $0.81 
Russia 0.0% 0.9% 1.2% 2.1% $39.6 $1,861 $4.41 18.8% $0.81 
Azerbaijan 0.4% 0.9% 0.7% 2.0% $1.5 $75 $10.79 36.4% $1.21 
Angola 1.7% 0.0% 0.2% 1.9% $2.4 $138 $11.02 35.0% $0.76 
India 1.5% 0.2% 0.2% 1.9% $38.2 $2,049 $7.79 5.9% $1.10 
El Salvador 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 1.8% $0.5 $25 $10.71 1.7% $1.12 
Bangladesh 0.1% 1.0% 0.5% 1.7% $3.1 $173 $12.71 3.4% $1.30 
Malaysia 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% $5.3 $338 $8.11 10.0% $0.68 
Total/wted av. 2.2% 0.8% 1.0% 4.0% $462 $10,175 $6.83 17.6% $0.75 
All 37 countries 1.1% 0.5% 0.5% 2.1% $493 $23,432 
   Sources: Subsidies: IEA (2016), other data: WDI (2016). 
 
The penultimate line in Table 2 shows that the GDP-weighted average share of GDP 
subsidies to oil and gas is 3.0% and for all subsidies is 4%. Electricity subsidies are 1% 
of GDP. As we have excluded the other 7 less-heavily subsidized countries (i.e. less than 
1.5% of GDP) that account for more than half the total GDP, the subsidy share for the 
fuller IEA sample of 37 countries is roughly half that of the HESEs.3  The 37 countries 
account for 32% of world GDP, and the 30 listed for 13% of the world total. The total 
natural resources rents in table 2 are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents as a share of GDP for 2013. 
                                                 
3 The IEA reports on 41 countries, but the data above excludes Colombia, Ghana, Taipei and 
Vietnam.  
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Figure 1 shows the top 25 countries ranked by total $ subsidy. The top six 
countries account for 60% of the total subsidies paid by these 25 countries (58% of the 
whole sample of 37 countries). China – a large country with a small subsidy share of 
GDP - ranks 10th in this group but falls outside table 2. 
 
Figure 1 Total subsidies by fuel for selected countries, US$ billion, 2014 
Source: WDI (2016).  
 
Figure 2 Energy subsidy rates increase with resource rent 
Source: WDI (2016).  
Energy subsidies by fuel, 2014
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Figure 2 and 3 show the expected relationship between resource endowment 
(rents as a share of GDP) and energy subsidies in total (also as a share of GDP) and the 
extent of gasoline subsidy (the price is for 2012, in which year the world average price 
was $1.41/litre and the US pump price was $0.97/litre). 
 
Figure 3 Highly resource intensive economies subsidize gasoline more heavily 
Source: WDI (2016). Gasoline pump prices include taxes as well as subsidies. 
Since 2013-14, oil and gas prices have fallen considerably, as figure 4 shows.  
 
Figure 4 Quarterly centred real oil and gas prices, 1997-2014 
Source: EIA, BP (2015) and World Bank (2016) deflated by US CPI. 
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As many of the HESE rely on resource rents for a large share of fiscal and export 
revenues, this will have had a dramatic effect on the budget and trade deficits, reducing 
the ability of these countries to maintain subsidies. If subsidies take the form of setting 
the domestic price of energy at an absolute level then the subsidy element will naturally 
fall with the fall in energy prices, offering the opportunity to ensure that local energy 
prices rise in line (and ideally catch up) with export (or import) prices. Indeed, one could 
defend this strategy as a rather inefficient way of hedging domestic consumers against 
fiscal and hence public spending volatility, although not as good as a sovereign wealth 
fund (that requires highly competent administration of the kind that few countries other 
than Norway have achieved for any sustained period). 
However, in many countries, Figure 3 shows that the domestic oil product prices 
are so far below export parity that this will not solve the problem without considerable 
price increases, and the Gulf States examples cited above suggests that once citizens 
appreciate the nature of the budgetary challenge they are often willing to accept the 
removal of the more visible subsidies on diesel and gasoline. Raising energy prices is 
likely to be politically more acceptable than reducing other social transfers. 
Figure 5 shows the significance of oil exports and total subsidies relative to GDP, 
showing what would have happened if the 2013 volume of exports were continued to 
2015, reflecting the impact of the price fall then. (The absolute level of oil production at 
these two prices and the level of oil subsidies are shown in Appendix figure A1.)   
 
Figure 5 Estimated values of 2013 oil exports and total subsidies as a share of GDP 
Note: Exports = production less consumption from BP (2015), valued at Brent oil prices  
* From IEA ( http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/) as BP consumption data lacking. 
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Clearly the impact on the balance of trade for some HESEs exceeded 10% of GDP, which 
represents a massive trade shock.  
3.  Electricity subsidies and the pricing of gas for power 
Figure 6 shows that electricity intensity (kWh/$(2011) PPP per capita GDP) rises with 
the electricity subsidy as a share of GDP. The squares show that across low middle and 
high income OECD countries electricity intensity rises somewhat but by nothing like as 
much as the range displayed by HESEs, suggesting that the relationship between 
electricity intensity and subsidy is strongly affected by the subsidy rate. (The squares are 
given a notional 0.4 of 1% subsidy to avoid overlaying the y-axis. Table A2 in the 
appendix gives the relevant additional data and also the carbon intensity for these 
countries.)  
 
Figure 6 Electricity intensity increases with electricity subsidies 
Note: The linked squares are the average intensities for Lower Middle Income (bottom) and 
OECD (top) countries 
Source: Appendix Table A2, IEA (2016), WDI 2016. 
 
Table 3 provides additional data for the electricity sector in HESEs, ranking the 
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subsidies as a proportion of GDP. Zero carbon electricity shares are mainly hydro but 
include wind and nuclear power, so the residual from the sum of the three fuel shares is 
the share of coal. The final two columns indicate the importance of gas in the country. 
Production is valued at German import gas prices (which in most cases represents a 
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massive overstatement of the true value, as discussed below, but allows a quantitative 
comparison relative to GDP across countries of very different sizes). The final column 
gives the ratio of reserves to 2014 production (which for Iraq is misleadingly high as 
production was unusually low in 2014).  
 
Table 3 Data for electricity sector, HESEs 
  subsidy/ fuel shares in generation 2013 prodn. R/P gas 
Country GDP gas oil zero-C gas/GDP 2014 
Kuwait 2.3% 37% 63% 0% 3% 109 
Saudi Arabia 1.8% 53% 47% 0% 4% 75 
Libya 1.9% 61% 39% 0% 12% 123 
Iraq 0.9% 54% 38% 8% 0% 2860 
Pakistan 0.9% 26% 37% 37% 6% 14 
El Salvador 1.8% 0% 34% 66% 0% n.a. 
Iran 3.9% 66% 26% 8% 13% 197 
Venezuela 3.4% 17% 15% 68% 3% 195 
Egypt 1.8% 77% 15% 9% 7% 38 
Argentina 1.2% 55% 14% 31% 3% 9 
Bangladesh 0.5% 83% 13% 4% 12% n.a. 
Indonesia 0.9% 24% 12% 13% 3% 39 
Algeria 1.4% 93% 7% 1% 14% 54 
Malaysia 0.0% 48% 4% 9% 7% 16 
Oman 1.9% 98% 3% 0% 12% 24 
India 0.2% 5% 2% 20% 2% n.a. 
UAE 0.9% 99% 1% 0% 5% 105 
Russia 1.2% 50% 1% 34% 11% 56 
Kazakhstan 0.2% 10% 1% 8% 3% 78 
Uzbekistan 2.2% 74% 1% 21% 33% 19 
Ukraine 2.1% 7% 0% 51% 7% 34 
Bahrain 4.4% 100% 0% 0% 14% 11 
Turkmenistan 2.3% 100% 0% 0% 44% 252 
Trin. & Tob. 1.4% 100% 0% 0% 53% 8 
Qatar 1.1% 100% 0% 0% 21% 138 
Azerbaijan 0.7% 93% 0% 7% 7% 69 
Bolivia 0.6% 66% 0% 34% 17% 14 
Ecuador 0.5% 100% 0% 0% 1% n.a. 
Angola 0.2% 93% 0% 7% 1% n.a. 
Brunei 0.0% 100% 0% 0% n.a. n.a. 
Sources: BP (2015), IEA (2016). 
Note: coal shares are the residual = 100% - sum of gas, oil and zero C 
 
The first point to note is that the domestic value of oil is effectively its world 
market price, but the domestic value of gas depends very much on the type of gas and its 
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access to export or import facilities. Associated gas can have a zero commercial (and 
negative social) value if surplus and flared, but if it can be exported or used domestically, 
its value will depend on its netback value. The value of non-associated gas will depend 
on whether it is scarce, whether it is in domestic surplus and can be exported, and 
whether exports are constrained by LNG or pipeline capacity. In these cases, if exports 
are capacity constrained and production constraints can be reasonably easily removed, the 
value of an extra unit of gas consumed locally (and specifically in electricity generation) 
is the extraction cost plus the present discounted future rent at the date of exhaustion or 
the date at which export constraints cease to bind. If R/P is high then this rent element 
could be very low. 
Krane (2015) provides useful data for the six Persian Gulf Monarchies (Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain, italicized in Table 3). Most started with 
associated gas, often flared and hence with zero (private) marginal value. Oman exports 
LNG and Qatar is the largest gas exporter, but domestic consumption is growing rapidly 
in Gulf countries, mainly for electricity production. Many countries fixed the price of gas 
and electricity in nominal terms when gas was surplus in the 1970s or 1980s, and have 
often not revised them or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, have reduced them. Saudi and 
Kuwaiti domestic electricity tariffs fell to less than 1 US ¢/kWh, and all six have tariffs 
for nationals less than 2 US¢/kWh (Krane, 2015, fig 10). 
Looking at the R/P ratios in table 3, one might expect the scarcity price of gas in 
seven of the top 9 countries (all except for Pakistan and El Salvador) should be low while 
their share of valuable oil use in generation is high, as are their subsidies to electricity (in 
all but one case above 1.8% of GDP, which is almost the share of value added of 
electricity in OECD countries). Assuming that they can expand gas production, removing 
any oil subsidies used in electricity generation and investing in cheap CCGTs would 
release oil for exports, and, with sensible gas pricing (at least for electricity), should be 
commercially attractive. The Saudi Electricity Company has had long-standing plans to 
reduce direct crude burn for electricity generation by more than 500,000 bbl/d by 
switching to natural gas, and has even more ambitious plans to expand solar and nuclear 
power in the next decade.4 However, rapid electricity demand growth continues to thwart 
that switch given the shortage of available gas, and the Kingdom continues to build oil-
fired capacity. 
3.1 Calculating electricity subsidies 
The way that electricity subsidies are calculated in table 3 is described as follows: 
“electricity reference prices were based on annual average-cost pricing for electricity in 
each country (weighted according to output levels from each generating option). In other 
words, electricity reference prices were set to account for the cost of production, 
transmission and distribution, but no other costs, such as allowances for building new 
                                                 
4 EIA at http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=SAU 
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capacity. They were determined using reference prices for fossil fuels and annual average 
fuel efficiencies for power generation. An allowance of $15/MWh and $40/MWh was 
added to account for transmission and distribution costs for industrial and residential 
uses, respectively. To avoid over-estimation, electricity reference prices were capped at 
the levelised cost of a combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant.”5 
That immediately raises the question of what is the sensible gas price and whether 
it is likely to differ from the reference gas price used in the subsidy estimation. The IEA 
uses export prices for gas exporters, but this seems to exclude the cost of any liquefaction 
or other transport costs and the shadow price of export constraints.6 
For gas-rich countries it is the current cost of extracting and delivering it to the 
power station plus the resource rent, which in many cases of high R/P, will be nearly 
zero. (Another test would be the netback value of gas used to manufacture and export 
fertilizers or LNG, fully accounting for the investment costs needed). However, in some 
of these countries gas extraction costs can be high (most Gulf Monarchies have difficult 
gas geologies and tight gas; Krane, 2015). Finding reliable data on the opportunity cost of 
gas for power is difficult, and evidence is patchy. Thus in 2014 Iran and Oman agreed on 
a gas pipeline to export 350 Bcf/yr to Oman, but while Iran expected a price of $11-14 
/mmBtu Oman aimed at $6-8/mmBtu (which would also have to cover the cost of the 
pipeline).7 At that time European gas prices were $11/mmBtu and in the US $5/mmBtu. 
Since then spot gas prices have fallen 60% in both these markets (Figure 4). In 2013 
Saudi Arabia sold domestically at $0.75/mmBtu compared to the Henry Hub price of 
$3.73/mmBtu,8 but this has since been increased to $1.25/mmBTu for power production. 
In the gulf Monarchies (apart from Qatar) extraction costs range from $3-9/mmBtu, but 
in Qatar might be below $1/mmBtu.9 
Egypt typically paid $2.65/mmBtu to foreign operators, considered by them too 
low to develop new fields.  More recently, EGAS has signed deals ranging from $3.95 to 
$5.88/mmBtu but this is for off-shore and deep-water fields that would be considerably 
more costly than on-shore fields. To gain some sense of on-shore gas costs excluding a 
                                                 
5 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/methodology/  
6 The IEA methodology states that “For net exporters, reference prices were based on the export 
parity price: the price of a product at the nearest international hub, adjusted for quality differences 
if necessary, minus the cost of freight and insurance back to the net exporter, plus the cost of 
internal distribution and marketing and any VAT.” This doubly overstates the opportunity cost of 
gas into power stations. 
7  The 400 km pipeline (200 km subsea) was estimated to cost $1.5 bn which, amortized over 20 
years at 12%, represents a cost of $1.75/MWhth (see 
https://www.pipelinesinternational.com/2016/03/26/kogas-to-construct-iran-to-oman-pipeline/ ) 
8 Price data mainly comes from the country fact sheets on the EIA website, http://www.eia.gov/. 
All $ are US$. 
9 Krane (2015) suggests production costs are below $1/mmBtu. 
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large scarcity rent, the US pre-shale gas prices from 1990- 2000 averaged $(2014) 
3.06/mmBtu ($10.4/MWhth)10 with a standard deviation of $0.73/mmBtu.  
The conclusion is that the efficient cost of gas for power generation varies even 
across the cheaper gas-rich countries, from $1-5/mmBtu ($3-17/MWhth), but this could 
be below the cost of tight gas, off-shore gas, or even pipeline gas, depending on the 
pipeline transit fee and the way the gas is priced (effectively how much monopoly rent 
the gas producer can extract from its favoured location and the extent of competition). 
3.2 Gas-fired generation costs 
The costs of generating electricity in a Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) includes 
fuel, other O&M costs and the return on and of the capital cost (capex). To convert from 
gas prices to fuel costs multiply the cost of gas measure in $/MWhth by two to give 
$/MWhe. Variable O&M costs were estimated at $3.6/MWh, fixed O&M at $13.2/MWh 
and capex at $14/MWh for a baseload CCGT in the US,11 totaling $31/MWh, but this 
might under-estimate the cost in the countries under consideration. Comparable European 
estimates (VGB, 2011) are €(2011)20/MWh or $(2015)29/MWh, so somewhere from 
$30-35/MWh might be a reasonable base-load charge to add to the fuel cost. For the gas-
rich countries considered above the levelised generation cost might range from $34-
70/MWh, with off-peak costs as low as the variable costs ($7-37/MWh) and the peak 
costs carrying an additional capacity cost of $90-105/MWh if recovered from 8 peaks 
hours per day. Thus even if the gas has a low opportunity cost, the capital and running 
costs considerably raise average generation costs, although with efficient hourly pricing 
the highest priced hours could be 10+ times off-peak prices (even higher multiples at 
seasonal peaks). 
As 177 countries have or are likely to sign a climate change agreement arising 
from COP21 in Paris in December 2015, it would be prudent to include a shadow carbon 
price when making electricity investment decisions, and arguably as a target for a 
subsidy-free future electricity price that should guide tariff setting policy. The US 
Government figure of $36/t CO2 cited above is highly sensitive to discount rates, and it is 
unlikely that oil and gas producers would agree (at least initially) prices much above the 
EUA rate of $7/tonne CO2. A price of $10/tonne CO2 (high by actually charged CO2 
prices) that would only raise the cost of CCGT generation by $4.5/MWhe, which is low 
compared to the capital and running costs, although quite significant when compared to 
off-peak variable costs. The lack of a carbon price does not seem to be a major factor in 
any observed underpricing of gas-fired electricity (oil would be at least twice as bad). 
Krane (2015) gives electricity prices to industrial customers in 2011 at $30/MWh 
in Saudi Arabia and Oman (or an implied wholesale price of $15/MWh if the IEA’s 
transmission and distribution (T&D) costs of $15/MWh are reasonable), $40/MWh in 
                                                 
10 Subscript th refers to the thermal value of the fuel as an input, subscript e to electricity output. 
11 From http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/capitalcost/pdf/updated_capcost.pdf at 12% over 25 yrs. 
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Bahrain ($25/MWh wholesale), $20/MWh (or $5 wholesale) in Qatar, and less than 
$9/MWh in Kuwait (not even bearing the T&D cost). Former Soviet countries in central 
Europe were notorious for underpricing energy and it is no surprise that industrial 
electricity prices in Ukraine are 6€¢/kWh and to households only 2€¢/kWh.12 
 Given that oil costs would be many times gas costs (and the carbon cost twice as 
high for oil compared to gas) and given that oil would be the peaking fuel in many of 
these countries, there is clearly massive electricity subsidy even if a lower opportunity 
cost of gas is used. Domestic electricity prices are typically even lower than industrial 
prices, despite needing substantially higher T&D costs, explaining the high overall level 
of electricity subsidy.  
                                                 
12 http://www.differgroup.com/Portals/53/images/Ukraine_overall_final.pdf  
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3.3 Decarbonizing electricity – the cost of renewables 
For the Mid-East and North Africa (MENA), grid-scale solar PV must be an attractive 
low-carbon option, particularly given the coincident air-conditioning load.13 MENA has 
insolation of 1,900-2,300 kWh/m2/yr, while the sunniest part of Germany (Munich) has 
only 1,200  kWh/m2/yr, and Berlin just over 1,000 kWh/m2/yr.14 One would therefore 
expect PV costs in MENA to be half those in Germany, which has enjoyed massive 
(although heavily subsidized) PV penetration. The costs per peak Watt (Wp) continue to 
fall, and were projected to be $1.43/Wp by 2020 (Brattle, 2015). Fraunhofer ISE (2015) 
forecasts levelised costs in North Africa and Saudi Arabia in 2025 at $33-55/MWh.15 
This is higher than off-peak gas-fired CCGT even with a $10/t CO2 price, but 
considerably lower than peak prices, so much depends on the coincidence of load and PV 
output. Just the variable cost of running a CCGT on distillate could be $80/MWhe ($90 
including a $10 CO2 price) so PV should be cheaper than oil-fired generation. 
Deserts near the sea, such as those in MENA countries, often have attractive wind 
conditions as dramatic land temperature changes relative to the sea can induce strong 
winds which rise in early evening and stay high overnight falling off mid-morning. In 
Saudi Arabia the wind speed can be over 7m/sec in some areas, and estimates that there 
are more than 20 GW of sites with capacity factors of 40% or more. The timing of wind 
power can therefore complement the fall off in solar PV and coincide with the evening 
peak air-conditioning demand, so competing with the high cost period of fossil 
generation. Egypt and Morocco had installed 800 MW by 2015 and Saudi Arabia set a 
renewable energy target of 9.5 GW by 2023.  Recent tender prices ranged from $25-
30/MWh in Morocco, and $40/MWh in Egypt, with one of the main barriers to further 
deployment being the lack of reliable wind data.16 At these prices, wind is clearly 
competitive against fossil generation, particularly as these three countries have relatively 
higher valued gas than in some other countries. 
3.4 Reforming electricity subsidies 
Electricity is so valuable that consumers are willing to pay very high prices rather than go 
without. This can be seen in the very high values for estimates of the value of lost load or 
energy unserved, and in the willingness to install diesel generators in countries where 
electricity is unreliable. There is clearly a high willingness and ability to pay, as 
evidenced by the very high costs for off-grid electricity and prices that are comparable to 
OECD levels for grid connected customers in many poor countries, notably in Africa. 
                                                 
13 In very hot countries there is another peak electric demand in the early evening when cooling is 
needed for night-time comfort and then desert wind may also be blowing more strongly, failing 
which back-up gas-fired generation will be needed. 
14 See http://solarelectricityhandbook.com/solar-irradiance.html  
15  Opex €20/kWp, 25 year life for cells, 15 yrs for inverter, 0.2% p.a. degradation, interest 5-6% 
16 The information in this paragraph is at http://analysis.windenergyupdate.com/emerging-
markets/suppliers-use-global-desert-data-spur-middle-east-growth  accessed 19/8/16 
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The problem of eliminating electricity subsidies is therefore entirely political – 
Governments fear it would be highly unpopular to remove existing consumer subsidies.  
Reforming electricity prices has, however, two related aspects, each of which 
raises different problems. The first step is to reform wholesale price-setting, which is 
critical to facilitating unsubsidized renewables, and, as the Chilean example shows 
(Galal, 1994, 1996), for privatizing the electricity supply industry and entrenching the 
removal of subsidies. In that sense it is the most direct way of supporting renewables and 
decarbonization. While this step has the advantage that the interest groups (owners of 
generation companies, investors) are likely to support it, the distribution companies 
(which may still be part of the generating companies) will go bankrupt if they cannot 
raise retail prices, which is the second and politically harder step. 
There are several possible responses to the feared unpopularity of raising retail 
prices. In some countries electricity reliability may be very low, forcing consumers to pay 
for back-up generation, and revealing a willingness to pay for improved reliability (Oseni 
and Pollitt, 2013). This offers the opportunity for the electricity utility to offer improved 
service for higher tariffs, which ideally could be contracted, with those unwilling to move 
to the higher quality service and pay cost-reflective tariffs being selectively disconnected 
before those with the improved contract. Such priority contracts have appealing 
efficiency properties as well as offering an escape from the subsidy dilemma (Chao and 
Wilson, 1987). 
Whitley and van der Burg (2015) provide supporting evidence of increasing 
willingness to remove fossil fuel subsidies, citing IEA (2014) and an IMF study of 28 
reforms, 12 of which were deemed successful (Clements et al., 2013). Thus Egypt has 
raised fuel prices by 78% and planned to double electricity prices over five years. 
Whitley and van der Burg (2015) note that low oil prices made it easier to remove 
consumption subsidies to oil products. They list a number of principles for reform, 
including “the efficient and visible reallocation of resources to those groups most affected 
through complementary measures. … where possible the best approach is to set 
ambitious goals, with slow, credible and specified timeframes for phasing out subsidies. 
This can include staggering the elimination of subsidies, and ideally should take place as 
part of broader sector or economy-wide reforms as part of a comprehensive approach.”  
That suggests finding a way to compensate those who would lose from reforming 
subsidies to the extent necessary to overcome entrenched opposition. Saudi Arabia is 
committed to reducing energy and utilities’ subsidies, by $30 billion/year by 2020.17 As 
part of its energy subsidy reform, the Iranian government has increased energy prices on 
several occasions, sometimes dramatically, but a failure to index prices in the face of high 
inflation has reversed these gains. Iran announced in early 2014 that electricity prices 
would increase by 25% and that in 2015 prices would increase again by another 20% to 
                                                 
17 Financial Times, 10/4/16. P7. 
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reduce subsidies.18 A clear example of a successful move to efficient pricing came from 
the trend-setting Chilean electricity reforms on the 1980s (Galal, 1994, 1996). 
The standard solution to reforming subsidies while protecting specified groups is 
to provide a specified number of kWh per month per household at the existing price, but 
charge the efficient price for amounts taken above that level. Such increasing block tariffs 
have been used in many countries (California is an example) and the Gulf countries 
including Iran have adopted this strategy, but often failed to have sufficiently high upper 
tiered tariffs. Between 2015 and 2016, Saudi Arabia slightly raised oil prices for power 
generation (but only to $5.87/bbl), considerably raised gas prices for power to 
$1.25/mmBtu and considerably raised the above 2,000 kWh/month block tariff for 
residential electricity (below that it remains at 1.25 US¢/kWh), so that above 6,000 
kWh/month it reaches 8 US¢/kWh (Krane and Hung, 2016, fig 4.). Note that the annual 
average UK residential consumption is less than 4,000 kWh, so these are still 
extraordinarily generous blocks. 
Another strategy has been to raise prices to foreign residents, and Dubai has 
eliminated all electricity subsidies on foreign residents (Krane and Hung, 2016). This 
may make electricity subsidies to nationals more explicit and hence ripe for reform. 
Fixed Transport and Distribution (T&D) costs can be also recovered from higher 
consuming customers per kWh/month up to the fixed T&D cost by offering customers a 
choice between a T&D charge per kWh or a fixed monthly payment. The size of the 
subsidized quantum may include an element of grandfathering for existing customers, 
reduced possibly to zero for new customers, and ideally reduced each year by a modest 
amount (e.g. 10%). Similarly, the carbon price can be phased in over time as part of the 
COP 21 reporting requirements. (Raising the domestic price of transport fuel to include 
not just the export parity value but also a reasonable road tax charge has higher priority in 
terms of reducing subsidies and restoring budgetary deficits, as figure 3 demonstrates.)  
4. Conclusion 
Energy subsidies in HESEs averaged 4% of GDP in 2014 (table 2), and were a major 
contributor to budget deficits. While they may have fallen as a share of GDP with falling 
oil and gas prices, so will tax revenues, and hence the budgets of resource rich countries 
will have been put under considerable stress. While it is difficult to reform subsidies, the 
best time to start the process is when oil and gas prices have fallen, the attraction of rents 
to potential opposition parties is reduced, and when the absolute level of subsidies may 
be at an historic low. The strategy is to incrementally remove subsidies by linking final 
prices to world market prices, and ideally escalating them in real terms over time. The 
UK successfully moved from almost the lowest gasoline taxes in Europe to the highest by 
raising fuel duties at 3% above the rate of inflation until the prices and taxes were 
                                                 
18 Business Monitor International (BMI) Research, Iran Power Report Q2 2015, p8. 
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deemed acceptable (a balance struck between the Treasury and the people). One of the 
simplest ways of reducing oil subsidies would be to replace oil-fired generation with gas, 
as oil has a world market price and gas should be substantially cheaper. 
In the electricity sector, underpricing was often inherited from past eras when gas 
had a negligible opportunity cost, as the alternative for associated gas was flaring, and a 
failure to index prices to the price index, and to index fixed cost to the written down 
replacement cost of the generation and transmission assets. That combination 
cumulatively led to extraordinarily low current domestic prices and correspondingly 
excessive electricity consumption per $GDP. With gas often now in short supply, no 
longer a cheap by-product as associated gas, its opportunity cost has risen, although how 
high depends on whether gas is export-constrained or imported, or requires the 
development of more costly fields. The wholesale levelised cost of CCGT with low gas 
costs might be $35/MWh, or $40/MWh with a $10/t. CO2 price, but could easily be 
double that level. At these prices, grid-scale solar PV and on-shore wind in suitable 
locations (notably MENA countries) can be viable without subsidies, although this will 
depend critically on the coincidence of load and PV and wind output, as off-peak gas 
power will be substantially cheaper than on-peak power. Fortunately wind and PV output 
appears complementary in coastal desert conditions, facilitating their joint deployment. 
To this would need to be added transmission and distribution (perhaps $15/MWh 
for industrial customers and up to $40/MWh for households, although the latter could be 
targeted on those of above average consumption). At these costs unsubsidized grid-scale 
solar PV can be competitive in high insolation countries, depending on its coincidence 
with load, such as the many HESEs in MENA. 
The transition to cost-reflective retail electricity pricing could start with rising 
block tariffs, in which existing tariffs (indexed at least to retail prices and better, to the 
export price of oil or gas) would be offered for the first number of kWh/month, with rates 
rapidly raised to cost-reflective levels above that. The first tranche could be either 
reduced in volume or raised in price more rapidly than the marginal tariffs, with the aim 
of eliminating subsidies over a modest period, depending on the degree of push-back. 
High electricity prices are politically sustainable in many countries – certainly in 
Germany and Denmark – and past electricity prices in relation to average incomes were, 
at least in inter-war Britain, ten times current ratios. The problem is not the level, but the 
transition to the efficient level, and designing an acceptable transition should be feasible 
but will need to be done with care. 
Once retail pricing has been reformed, wholesale electricity and gas prices can be 
allowed to rise to their efficient level, at which point unsubsidized renewable electricity 
becomes a realistic prospect in many of these countries. 
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Table A1 Gas data for HESE 
   average production value**  subsidy R/P ‘14  GDP prod/ 
 Country* 2006-14 CV 2014 $bn yrs $bn GDP 
Iran $53.26 20% $55.73 $22.30 197 $425 12.5% 
Libya $4.78 24% $3.95 $0.10 123 $41 11.6% 
Turkmenistan $21.16 27% $22.37 $3.30 252 $48 44.2% 
Venezuela $10.93 16% $9.23 $3.30 195 $381 2.9% 
Uzbekistan $20.46 14% $18.50 $7.10 19 $63 32.7% 
Saudi Arabia $31.87 20% $34.95 $8.30 227 $746 4.3% 
Algeria $29.81 15% $26.90 $3.20 54 $214 14.0% 
Oman $9.61 18% $9.36 $2.50 62 $82 11.7% 
Egypt $20.89 17% $15.73 $1.60 38 $287 7.3% 
Bahrain $4.86 19% $5.46 $0.00 11 $34 14.4% 
Bolivia $5.73 25% $6.92 $0.20 14 $33 17.4% 
Iraq $0.45 37% $0.41 $0.10 2860 $224 0.2% 
Kuwait $4.92 22% $5.29 $1.30 12 $164 3.0% 
Ukraine $9.61 18% $9.36 $3.70 62 $132 7.3% 
Trinidad&Tobago $15.34 13% $13.58 $0.00 8 $29 53.1% 
Indonesia $27.43 14% $23.70 $0.00 39 $889 3.1% 
Qatar $44.28 46% $57.23 $1.60 4 $210 21.1% 
Pakistan $15.09 15% $13.57 $4.50 14 $244 6.2% 
Argentina $14.56 16% $11.44 $4.70 9 $538 2.7% 
Kazakhstan $6.08 20% $6.22 $0.50 78 $218 2.8% 
Russia $212.12 16% $186.87 $17.50 56 $1,861 11.4% 
Azerbaijan $5.02 31% $5.47 $0.70 69 $75 6.7% 
Malaysia $22.79 14% $21.45 $0.00 16 $338 6.7% 
Nigeria $13.07 23% $12.46 $0.10 132 $569 2.3% 
Thailand $12.39 25% $13.60 $0.30 6 $405 3.1% 
Mexico $20.50 12% $18.76 $0.60 6 $1,295 1.6% 
Sources: IEA (2015), BP (2015) 
Notes * Countries ranked in descending order of total subsidies as share of GDP 
** Gas valued at real German import prices  
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Table A2 Electricity and energy data 
  electricity per $(2011) PPP '000 electricity GDP PPP electricity 
  
subsidy  
% GDP 
energy 
kgoe 
electricity 
MWh 
CO2 
tonnes 
cons 
kWh/yr per cap 
Cag* % 
p.a. 
Bahrain 4.4% 243 418 452 17,530 $41,932 -2.6% 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.9% 185 166 435 2,662 $16,023 4.0% 
Venezuela, RB 3.4% 128 181 377 3,197 $17,690 1.3% 
Kuwait 2.3% 132 210 368 15,552 $74,181 -2.4% 
Turkmenistan 2.3% 370 180 1,072 2,444 $13,555 3.0% 
Uzbekistan 2.2% 284 326 887 1,631 $5,002 -1.0% 
Ukraine 2.1% 306 439 756 3,662 $8,338 0.8% 
Libya 1.9% 139 182 563 3,552 $19,557 0.5% 
Oman 1.9% 160 153 476 5,929 $38,835 5.0% 
Saudi Arabia 1.8% 130 161 381 7,870 $48,963 4.1% 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1.8% 88 169 262 1,701 $10,050 3.4% 
El Salvador 1.8% 88 109 145 857 $7,838 1.4% 
Trin & Tobago 1.4% 478 204 1,248 6,189 $30,390 3.8% 
Algeria 1.4% 94 84 255 1,122 $13,301 5.8% 
Argentina 1.2%       2,901 $3,175** 4.0% 
Russian Fed  1.2% 216 275 560 6,486 $23,561 1.0% 
Qatar 1.1% 143 113 328 15,123 $133,395 -0.5% 
Indonesia 0.9% 88 70 260 681 $9,675 6.2% 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.9% 124 170 355 10,537 $62,056 -1.3% 
Pakistan 0.9% 106 102 218 457 $4,476 -1.2% 
Iraq 0.9% 98 89 318 1,341 $15,124 9.2% 
Azerbaijan 0.7% 89 103 232 1,705 $16,593 -2.8% 
Bolivia 0.6% 129 105 286 637 $6,091 4.7% 
Ecuador 0.5% 92 115 237 1,217 $10,626 6.3% 
Bangladesh 0.5% 76 91 144 258 $2,843 6.3% 
Kazakhstan 0.2% 213 218 761 4,893 $22,470 2.0% 
India 0.2% 118 136 355 698 $5,132 5.9% 
Sri Lanka 0.2% 48 48 82 491 $10,242 4.0% 
Mexico 0.1% 96 129 246 2,074 $16,141 1.3% 
Brunei  0.0% 105 123 333 8,657 $70,535 1.9% 
Gabon 0.0% 79 58 83 1,045 $18,172 2.7% 
Malaysia 0.0% 129 176 361 4,114 $23,419 5.7% 
Nigeria 0.0% 142 27 103 149 $5,448 3.5% 
Thailand 0.0% 133 154 332 2,305 $14,943 3.1% 
    
   
  
 
  
High income: non-OECD 149 201 387 6,309 $31,367 1.6% 
Lower middle income 115 126 294 699 $5,527 4.1% 
Middle income 140 190 413 2,716 $17,299 3.5% 
Upper middle income 153 220 473 2,909 $13,201 6.6% 
World   131 216 368 3,021 $13,994 1.9% 
Sources: IEA (2105), World Bank Development Indicators 
Notes: * compound average growth (rate) 
** Argentina PPP GDP estimated from market prices and Latin American conversion to PPP. 
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Figure A1 Value of oil production and subsidies for selected HESE 
Note: Oil valued at Brent crude prices. Saudi production in 2012 was US$452 billion 
 
 
Figure A2 Production average and variability and subsidies for selected HESE 
Note: Production valued at German gas import prices, Russia average = $212 bn 
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